Electoral dilemma: a drain on votes
In recent years, the fight against climate change has been pushed out of the center of European political attention. While in the 2019 European Parliament elections it was the second most important driver of voter mobilization, in 2024 it did not even make it into the top five.
The decline in public awareness and the rise of “greenlash” (a backlash against environmental policies) may be behind this phenomenon. The latter is fueled by a certain public discontent with the ecological transition policies implemented. Notably, the primary sector has strongly opposed restrictions on fertilizer and pesticide use, the lack of protection against unfair trade practices, and the vulnerability of European agriculture in the face of new free trade agreements.
This discontent was reflected in an electoral debacle for the main green party in the European Parliament (losing 21 seats compared to 2019), paving the way for a rise in the far right, staunch defenders of environmental deregulation.
Added to this is the fact that the most urgent current events are reshaping priorities. The war on Europe’s borders, Donald Trump’s return to the White House, and the questioning of key organizations such as NATO have triggered a climate of mistrust. Security and defense have become the main concerns, able to mobilize huge sums of money, increase debt, and redirect allocations in the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034 (a much less green budget).
Thus, European leadership faces a first dilemma: green policy is no longer an electoral priority, while other issues dominate the headlines. Nevertheless, the Green Deal continues with future implementation programs under the leadership of a Commission that insists it will “not reduce its commitment to decarbonization.”
Geopolitical dilemma: between Washington and Beijing
While the green compass seems to have completely lost its North, the geopolitical course is drifting. In recent years, Brussels’ official discourse promised that the green transition would also deliver strategic autonomy. However, the reality is that, instead of independence, the European Union has consolidated new critical dependencies on two fronts: Washington and Beijing.
The Russian gas crisis opened a new chapter of transatlantic subordination, this time in the energy sphere. European imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States soared by 901.56% between January 2021 and January 2024.
To make matters worse, after the new trade agreement signed on July 27, the European bloc committed to accelerating this trend by purchasing $250 billion annually over the next three years. According to a report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, this agreement not only delivers a blow to the green transition but also threatens the bloc’s energy security.
The other side of this dependency is the lever of the green transition itself. The main supplier of critical raw materials needed for renewable energy infrastructure is Beijing. From rare earths for wind turbines to lithium and graphite for batteries, China accounts for 70% of global production and over 90% of refining capacity. This allows it to dominate the lithium battery production chain, manufacture electrolysers two to five times cheaper than European ones, and control 80% of the global solar panel market.
However, China is not only a key supplier of strategic resources but is also now the largest source of imports into the EU. What is troubling is not just the scale of this relationship but the imbalance that comes with it. In 2024, the EU’s trade deficit with Beijing reached €305.8 billion, double the figure of just a decade ago.
This asymmetry creates an obvious strategic dilemma: can Europe have real leverage at the negotiating table with China if its transition and energy security largely depend on access to Chinese materials?
In short, the rhetoric of strategic autonomy loses credibility when the main arteries of the transition, energy and critical resources, are in the hands of external powers. In international politics, independence is measured not only in declarations but in guaranteed supply chains and signed contracts.
Competitiveness dilemma: Draghi and Letta’s warnings ignored
Competing or declining. This is how former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi describes the EU’s economic future in his report on competitiveness, a view shared by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta in his analysis of the single market. Both warn of prolonged stagnation in productivity and investment, eroding the bloc’s ability to maintain its weight in the global economy.
The economic impact of this paralysis is already being felt: Europe is losing global market share, the technology gap with the United States is widening, and dependence on third countries in strategic sectors is growing. To remedy this, the Commission has launched the Net-Zero Industry Act, a roadmap designed to boost manufacturing capacity in critical technologies for the green transition, from solar panels to batteries. In other words, it seeks to produce within EU borders what is currently massively imported. Among its objectives is to achieve the production of 40% of the technologies needed to reach net zero emissions by 2030.
However, the reality is that much of this technology currently arrives “Made in China” and at much lower prices. This places the EU at a crossroads. Deepening its reliance on China as a supplier for its energy transition could widen the strategic gap with a country Brussels openly labels a “systemic rival.” This situation echoes the EU’s decision decades ago to build its energy system on easy, cheap Russian gas.
Draghi stresses that this dependence is not only a threat to energy security but also to the industrial base. If access to resources and the regulatory framework outside the EU prove more favorable, companies may relocate production to where conditions are better. In fact, major solar industry producers issued an ultimatum to the Commission earlier this year. The consequence: an industrial exodus that would further erode competitiveness. Therefore, while increasing efforts to strengthen Europe’s technological industry is welcome, achieving climate goals will require balancing the competitiveness of European companies with the affordability of the transition. Draghi warns that betting on environmental deregulation will not solve the competitiveness crisis. In fact, it could worsen it by undermining innovation and reducing Europe’s appeal as a leader in clean technologies.
Conclusion, avoid a strategic déjà vu:
Von der Leyen’s shift towards deregulating the green agenda may aim to strengthen security and competitiveness, but it also threatens climate goals and credibility. The dilemmas described, electoral, geopolitical, and economic, show the risk of Europe repeating past mistakes of dependency. At stake is more than the future of the Green Deal: it is the EU’s capacity to combine sustainability, autonomy, and prosperity.
Eroding the discourse on strategic autonomy, climate regulation, and the energy transition could undermine not only Europe’s unity but also Von der Leyen’s already fragile credibility. Yet this comes at a time when Europeans are demanding the opposite: more action against climate change, especially young people, and a more united Europe in the face of global challenges.
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