Le Taurillon, magazine eurocitoyen

International Court of Justice – Kosovo: a legal independence for a total dependence

Pierre Bonifassi, Translated by Roberta Carbone — 2010-09-08T03:00:00Z

Belgrade and Pristine were waiting for a consensual outcome, vague enough for them to declare themselves both winners of the diplomatic battle. A judgement oscillating between problematic legality and legitimate illegality, which would have avoided definitively solving a thorny issue.

On the contrary, the sentence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), presented on Thursday, July 22nd at The Hague, is surprisingly clear and without appeal. Kosovo's independence, declared unilaterally in February 2008, does not violate any rule of the international law. Therefore, it is judged legal without condition. This is a definite victory for Pristine, however it is not really going to reverse the trend. Kosovo continues to be politically and economically subdued to the international community.

The ICJ, in charge of solving the disputes between states, was summoned by Serbia in October 2008 in order to decide if the declaration of independence was “conform to the international law”. The opinion given by the ICJ is not binding for UN member states, therefore Serbia and the opponents of Kosovo's independence are not obliged to revise their political position in the next days. On the other hand though, more than thirty countries were waiting for this judgement to have their say. Today 69 countries recognize Kosovo, among them the US and 22 of the 27 member states of the EU. A number which is going to rise in the next weeks.

If Kosovo's independence seems more credible after the ICJ's judgement, it is not going to convince the tireless opponents of Pristine. Serbia has immediately declared that it will “never” recognize the independence of its former province and, by doing this, it is followed by powerful allies such as Russia, China or Spain, themselves trying to solve the problem of regional independence movements and of minorities. According to these states, the unilateral declaration of Kosovo would be a precedent for numerous European regions (e.g. Catalonia, Transnistria, Russian republics) and for some Balkan minorities (Serbian in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albanian in Macedonia, Hungarian in Slovakia). Actually, these last ones could use Kosovo for their independence requests, casting doubt upon the international frontiers agreement and permanently destabilising the region. Kosovo would then be the starting point of a «domino game» of declarations of independence, which would cross Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caucasus.

If Kosovo's independence seems more credible after the ICJ's judgement, it is not going to convince the tireless opponents of Pristine

Kosovo: the isolated domino

These fears are justifiable but this kind of scenario is not credible. In fact there could have been a possible chain reaction of declarations of independence in 2008, after Pristine declared independence itself. But there wasn't. The independence movements didn't use Kosovo to undertake their battle and the decision of the ICJ didn't attain that objective either. In any case, the international community would not tolerate a continuous disintegration of states in the world, and this without prejudging its coherence.

Thus it is improbable that Kosovo will become a model for these regions, also because before the declaration of independence it was under United Nations mandate (1999-2008), which conferred it a particular and unique status. Actually Kosovo was already autonomous and independent from Serbia as a will of the international community. In any case the judgement of the ICJ underlines that the declaration of independence was in contradiction neither with the United Nations mandate nor with the constitutional basis of that country. Therefore Kosovo's situation is very specific and it has the exceptional support of the United States and of the European Union, which, in any case, would not accord other «bonuses» for the provinces in the Balkan region to secede: the stability of the frontiers remains a priority for Brussels, given the difficulties in attaining it.

Declaration of dependence

The ICJ's sentence is not going to change the trend for Kosovo. Actually, it could only confer it more credibility in the negotiations for joining the United Nations. On the other hand a negative outcome would not have changed the present scheme either. The European and international perspective would have stayed the same and the international donors, with their development programmes, would not have left the country for that. Concerning the US, they have already announced that they would not consider a negative judgement from the ICJ.

The judges of The Hague have given a juridical opinion, not a political one, because they pronounced themselves on the legality rather than on Kosovo's ability in creating an independent state. However, it is exactly on this point that the political debate begins. Kosovo's priorities stay the same after the ICJ's sentence: establishing the rule of law and recovering from a disastrous economic situation. Kosovo's development perspectives are nearly non-existent: embedded, worked on, consumed by corruption, the country does not export anything and imports everything, including what it could produce by itself. Although the biggest resource of the country are the young people (50% of the population is under 25), the unemployment of youngsters peaks at more than 70%. Thus, economically the country lives on international aid.

Politically, it owes everything to the US and Europe and remains totally subordinated to their agenda.

Even if Kosovo is now legally independent, it has signed with the international community a declaration of political and economic dependence for the next decades. From now on the question is whether Kosovo will be able to maintain its independence.

Pierre Bonifassi, Translated by Roberta Carbone

International-Court-of-Justice-Kosovo-a-legal-independence-for-a?lang=en

Image: Flags of Kosovo and Albania, source:'Flickr 'Advocacy Project'

Editorial: Kosovo's (in)dependence

Peter Matjašič — 2010-09-08T02:24:00Z

On 22nd July 2010 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has issued a surprisingly unequivocal, albeit in a non-binding advisory opinion, verdict clearly stating that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate general international law. What are the consequences and effects of this ruling for Kosovo and Serbia, for the broader region of Western Balkans, for similar disputes around the world and for further development of international law?

For the coming few days thenewfederalist.eu will try to answer this question by shading some light on the different aspects of this complex issue with three interesting articles as well as provoke some food for thought with the present editorial.

The first article is entitled International Court of Justice–Kosovo: a legal independence for a total dependence. Written by Pierre Bonifassi, a member of JEF-Bordeaux, it was initially published in French on his blog a day after the ruling and on 4th August 2010 on our sister-website Le Taurillon. Bonifassi makes an objective assessment of the expectations prior to the ruling by both sides involved and then goes on to touch upon two very important issues. The first is the question of recognition of an independent Kosovo and points out to the existing situation in terms of states pro and contra. The second one is even more relevant and has to deal with the de facto dependence of Kosovo (regardless of its status) on international aid. Bonifassi thus successfully points out pending questions but does not aim to provide any answers.

The second article in this editorial series dedicated to the ICJ ruling on Kosovo is entitled The Need to Recognise Kosovo by Johannes Langer, a member of JEF-Austria and Editor-in-Chief of Global View. Langer reminds us of some of the known facts but decides to give the article a more EU-focused twist. While rightly pointing out the current economic and social problems Kosovo is facing Langer makes an intriguing call for the need of putting Kosovo on a EU-track towards long-term membership talks and short-term visa liberalisation. Langer claims that the current five EU member states yet to recognise Kosovo – namely Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – would be better advised to do so immediately for the benefit of the entire Western Balkans region.

The third article comes from Jofre Rocabert, a member of JEF-Catalunya, and carries the title International Court of Justice: Kosovo ruling with a revealing subtitle Doctrinal consequences and case comparisons. As the subtitle implies Rocabert's article focuses on the legal aspects and meaning of the advisory opinion as well as its (non)applicability. Rocabert offers an insightful conclusion that the ICJ established a new doctrinal line that might make it a lot more difficult for the states to oppose independence movements within its territory with legal arguments based on international case law. More importantly Rocabert looks into the possible comparisons between the Kosovo case and similar other regional cases, especially within his home country Spain. Interestingly enough, so far no relevant media group or political party has tried a direct comparison between Kosovo and cases like Catalonia, Flanders or Scotland.

71 and counting…

One thing is certain, however, Kosovo's call for recognition of its independence by those who have yet to make up their minds about it has received a big boost by the ICJ ruling. To date, 71 countries have recognised Kosovo's independence, including the US and 22 out of 27 EU member states. Countries such as Russia, China and India will probably not be moved by the advisory opinion and rather stick to their claims and support to Serbia's cause based on their own troubled regions and/or interests. But many countries have decided to wait for the ICJ ruling before making up their mind and surely such a clear ruling in favour of Kosovo will help make up their mind as it recently happened with Honduras and Qatar in the last weeks.

Serbia and its UN General Assembly resolution

A more interesting development to follow will be within Serbia, where the incumbent President Boris Tadić secured his win in last presidential elections by claiming he can combine reaching the goal of EU accession and continuing to insists on Kosovo being part of Serbia. What will be the consequences of such an outward punch in the face by the ICJ for Serbian politics in the long run remains to be seen. What is certain already is that Serbia seems to have backed down slightly as its proposal for a UN General Assembly resolution on the matter of Kosovo – to be discussed in New York later this week – no longer contains a condemnation of Kosovo's declaration of independence and calls on both sides to engage in dialogue rather than talks on all open questions. This dialogue is due to take place under the sponsorship of the European Union rather than the United Nations. In this respect, EU's foreign affairs chief Ashton and President Tadić are said to work jointly on possible amendments to this UNGA draft resolution.

What next?

The Kosovo case is a sui generis one that should be dealt with as such. The problems linked to the topic are many fold but at least the ICJ provided some surprising clarity in terms of international legal framework.

The Kosovo government will now continue their struggle in getting as many countries recognise them as possible. Rightly so, but this struggle should not be used as an excuse nor their opponents as scapegoats nor to turn a blind eye on their internal political and socio-economic problems. The Serbian government should once and for all stop beating around the bush and (mis)using the highly emotional and sensitive issue of Kosovo to divert attention from their own socio-economic problems and acknowledge that their path to fully-fledged EU membership is a necessity for the region as a whole, but that this path necessarily leads via dialogue with Prishtina. The EU should make sure that it has a unified position on the question of recognition of Kosovo and engage in a quick visa liberalisation process for Kosovars, help build up mutual trust and understanding in the region and stop jeopardising its own credibility by the selfish national interests of its member states.

The ICJ has made a surprisingly clear legal ruling. Let us hope that the political decisions that follow it will be as surprising in their boldness and vision and aimed at a peaceful and swift resolution of this pending conflict.

Peter Matjašič

Editorial-Kosovo-s-in-dependence?lang=en

Images: Writing with Pen, source: Google images

The European Union and the Crisis

Michele Gruberio, Translated by Francesco Santini — 2010-09-07T11:54:10Z

The German proposal to reform the Maastricht criteria (in order to have a more binding criteria and heavier penalties for those who do not comply with them) has prematurely ignited a debate on which areas of the public budget have to be cut down. As a result, this debate has drawn attention to national social policies, which are the most likely budgetary areas to suffer cuts and adjustments.

Room for social policies

In order to understand the current situation, it is appropriate to analyse the social policies in Europe in a historical perspective. Since the end of the Second World War, Western Europe has developed a welfare system completely different from that of the United States, especially from the one put forward by the republican governments. Actually, the US themselves contributed to establishing the European social model through the Marshall Plan.

Post-WWII Europe needed to meet the citizens' social needs

Post-WWII Europe needed to meet the citizens' social needs which were already present prior to the conflict such as: large-scale public education, certainty of a home and work and a health care accessible to all. In each European national state the peculiar pattern of divergence between governments and social groups caused the emergence of different models of social state. Since then, the European institutions have had an inadequate and uneven approach in this area. In its early years the ‘ECSC' developed its own model which was about trying to find a harmony between employers and workers and eventually turned out to be successful. Moreover, this model allowed the matching of the monetary, fiscal and political needs with those of the historical contrasting conditions of the Cold War.

Post-WWII Europe needed to meet the citizens' social needs which were already present prior to the conflict such as: large-scale public education, certainty of a home and work and a health care accessible to all.

In particular the ECSC model managed to align the necessity of a relation with the US with the approach of the trade unions that were far too close to the national communist parties. In practice the social policy realised by ECSC addressed the social problems caused by ECSC itself: the reorganisation of the coal-mining and steel industry. The means used were the most common ones: funds to protect workers and the industries themselves. The European communities that came later did not commit themselves in the same way in the social field. Actually the only country among the six founding members that pushed for a European common approach on the topic was Italy (because of her strong regional imbalances). This lack of European commitment in the social area meant a strong boost to the free movement of labour, to the protection of workers' rights in destination countries, anti-unemployment measures, training plans and professional preparation. Hence, a long work was done to include these issues in the treaties of Rome.

At the end of the 1960s the European Community had to again address problems such as unemployment, immigration and education. The European Economic and Social Committee was an important but often forgotten innovation introduced by the treaties of Rome and progressively deprived of its real potential. When employers and their associations found out more suitable channels to lobby their interests, they quit this institution and left it to trade unions. Moreover, the very functioning of the EESC has made it eclipsing and caused its main problems such as opinions remained unheeded and recommendations sent too late. EESC represents the emblem of what the European institutions have not been able to do for years: use their position to be heard. Few years later, during the 1970s, the European structure changed radically and also in its approach to social issues. The turning point was the movement of 1968. Up to that time the Common Agricultural Policy and the free movement were the only common policy areas of the EEC with repercussions to the social field. Eventually, social policies were included among the competences of the EEC as one of the result of the Council of Paris in 1974. The ambitions in the social field were great and to achieve them a Community action was fundamental.

The 1970s witnessed severe crisis, especially for young people looking for their first job. Of primary importance became reducing unemployment and therefore vocational training was funded. In this context the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training was established. This European agency started to draw attention, but it was evident that adequate social policies needed more money, yet there was a lack of political willingness to fund such programmes. For this reason the main measures adopted were legislative acts, as in the cases of equal opportunities, disabled people and the European Social Dialogue (within which the European Trade Union Confederation was established). These actions did not represent any cost for the European Institutions, gave leeway to national states and allowed the European Community to avoid facing its social responsibilities. Only after 1985 social issues went on the agenda again. This is the case of the White Book of the Delors Commission “Completing the internal market” which seemed to be based on notions of neoliberalism but came from people who were not really neoliberals (such as Mitterand, Kohl, Delors). Rather than proposing a common European social model however, the European Union since then sends recommendations to national states. The only area where the European intervention appears to be relevant is the employment but also in this case is limited to the financing of unilateral programmes undertaken by singular European states.

At this point an important question is: why in this context the EU did not start from the bottom by establishing an authentic European society to which it would be easier to apply a unified European policy? We should properly estimate however, the real achievements of the Union.

Welfare is costly!

These achievements are few, but should be considered in a historical perspective: the European project started in a continent destroyed by the most devastating war ever. Nowadays it would be senseless to find excuses and to not see the reality: welfare is costly! Welfare states were established in a historical moment that made it possible. The not so easy task of reallocating the resources for social purposes was lightened by a great economic growth, in a moment of relatively weak global competition. In the light of what is happening today the main objective is therefore to save what is still left of these welfare systems: namely to save what we still can.

Consequently, the German proposal should be considered in relation to the current global situation. In a globalised economic system competition is strong. Economies such as the Indian and Chinese ones have a better position in the global competition due to their less developed welfare system and lower labour cost. The rapid decreasing of resources' availability is a matter of concern not only for Italy but for the entire Europe. In the European Union what has been the role of the Commission and what of the national states? They normally propose solutions for the short term but the question is constantly the same: who has to pay for the crisis? Can we afford to keep spending relatively more just because we are protected by our euro ‘shield'? If the holder of the shield is weak, how can we bear this situation in the long run? Hence, when the last breaking point is reached a domino effect for Europe and then for the whole world will become a possible scenario.

The functions of Euro

Is the only function of Euro is to protect us? Or do we need something else for our development? Here we should not underestimate the power of a strong currency. Americans can take advantage of the dollar as there is somebody ruling over it. The European integration reached thanks to the Euro should remind us of the power of currencies for specific purposes. Nevertheless, we should learn how to make use of currencies. In order to do so there is only one way: equalising the value of the currency with the real value of the economy. Today, the problems are the substantial economies and the governments that control them. This does not mean that the Euro has been poorly managed. Actually the contrary is true, the good management of the Euro is due to the fact that the European Central Bank has been based on the principle of responsibility. Therefore, the ECB has properly addressed the crisis but keeps tottering because of the lack of a unified government supporting its action.

United or we will perish

In this moment of crisis who looks after the European Economy? And who will look after it in the future? Is the option proposed by Zingales of a pull-out of Greece from the Euro feasible? This solution would not we just create further gaps? Once again there is only one way out: a common European fiscal and economic policy ruled by a European government which is properly empowered and thus able to provide an appropriate guidance. We also need a common European budget in support of the economy and of the people. The solution for the crisis should not necessarily be at citizens' expense. Either we become united or we will perish, for the umpteenth time.

Michele Gruberio, Translated by Francesco Santini

The-European-Union-and-the-Crisis?lang=en

Image: Money 50 Euro, source: Flickr Creative Commons

L'Unione perde fascino

Jacopo Barbati — 2010-09-06T23:48:42Z

La crisi danneggia l'appeal dell'Unione. O meglio, è l'Unione che ha danneggiato sé stessa con la risposta inadeguata che ha saputo (o sarebbe più corretto dire “voluto”?) dare alla crisi economica mondiale dell'ultimo biennio (Le potenzialità per fare di meglio ci sarebbero state…)

Due storie diverse, ma non troppo

Ciò si riflette nel crollo del consenso popolare sull'adesione all'UE in due Paesi strategicamente molto importanti: l'Islanda e la Turchia. La sperduta isoletta dall'economia e dal welfare sviluppatissimi, fino al crollo economico dovuto alla crisi, e l'eterna fidanzata d'Europa, a metà tra Oriente e Occidente, Paese gigantesco dalla storia millenaria e roccaforte dell'islamismo laico e moderato. Curioso notare come questi Paesi siano in condizioni diversissime l'un dall'altro: l'Islanda, come detto, deve riprendersi da una durissima crisi economica che l'ha portata quasi al tracollo economico e istituzionale; la Turchia, invece, ha un PIL in crescita del 12% annuo e ricopre un ruolo dominante nel medio oriente: è il primo partner commerciale di quasi tutte le repubbliche arabe dell'area. Inoltre, cosa non sottovalutabile, esercita una notevole influenza culturale grazie alla vasta produzione cinematografica e televisiva: le telenovela turche sono famosissime in tutto il mondo arabo.

Legittimo disincanto

Quel che avevano in comune Islanda e Turchia era l'ampio consenso popolare sull'adesione all'UE registrato nel 2009 (e in Turchia anche prima, grazie all'impegno dei politici locali – non sempre contraccambiati da quelli di Bruxelles), attestabile all'80% circa in entrambe le nazioni.

Quel che hanno in comune Islanda e Turchia è il crollo del suddetto consenso, dall'80% al 50%, dovuto all'inadeguatezza dimostrata dall'Unione nella gestione della crisi economica e agli annaspamenti del caso Grecia. Gli islandesi hanno iniziato a pensare che entrare nell'UE non possa aiutarli a superare la crisi; i turchi possono ritenere che far parte di un sistema non proprio così efficiente come si possa pensare rappresenti più un danno che un vantaggio.

E perché dar loro torto? Del resto, ognuno fa la fine che si merita; e l'UE non poteva immaginare fine migliore

… È la Turchia ad aver bisogno dell'Ue, o è l'Ue ad aver bisogno della Turchia …

,per la propria immagine e credibilità dopo la limitata ed inadeguata reazione alla crisi economica, che ha fatto emergere tutti i limiti di un sistema ancora basato su dinamiche nazionalistiche e che, ormai pare lamapante, potrebbe essere molto più efficace ed efficiente se solo seguisse la sua naturale evoluzione, ossia trasformandosi in Federazione. Chissà se vivremo abbastanza a lungo per vedere accadere ciò…

Le buone notizie

Tuttavia, da nord arrivano buone notizie. Nonostante l'equivoco sentimento popolare, in questi giorni sta per iniziare il processo di adesione dell'Islanda all'UE. I negoziati potrebbero incontrare delle difficoltà dovute all'incompatibilità tra la politica ittica islandese (che tollera la caccia alle balene con limiti territoriali marini vastissimi) e alle tensioni createsi con Regno Unito e Paesi Bassi a causa dei molti debiti contratti dagli islandesi e non ancora saldati (decine di miliardi di euro). Inoltre, qualora i negoziati dovessero andare a buon fine, la parola definitiva sull'ingresso dell'Islanda nell'Unione sarà data da un referendum popolare. E con questi chiari di luna…

Le cattive notizie

È lecito essere ancor più pessimisti sul caso turco. Dopo tanti anni di tira e molla, nonché di pareri negativi dai sempre più influenti partiti nazionalisti ed anti-islamici (e non) sparsi in tutta Europa, è lecito attendersi un calo di interesse da parte della Turchia sull'ingresso nell'Unione. Anche perché, come detto, l'influenza turca nell'aerea medio-orientale è corposa e crescente, e da qui alla costituzione di una “lega araba medio-orientale” il passo potrebbe essere più breve di quel che si pensa. Quindi, qui la domanda sorge spontanea: è la Turchia ad aver bisogno dell'Europa, o viceversa?

Jacopo Barbati

L-Unione-perde-fascino?lang=it

Fonte dell'immagine: World Wide Web

Que la liberté de circulation ne soit plus limitée à trois mois !

Fabien Cazenave — 2010-09-06T04:00:00Z

La liberté de circulation des personnes est avec la citoyenneté européenne un des éléments les plus concrets de la construction de l'Europe pour les citoyens. Avec l'expulsion de Roms par la France vers la Roumanie ou la Bulgarie, le grand public découvre qu'en Europe un Etat-membre peut expulser des citoyens européens hors de son territoire à partir du moment où il réside plus de trois mois sur celui-ci.

La directive n° 2004/38/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 réglemente le droit des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de leurs familles de circuler et de séjourner librement sur le territoire des États membres. Cette directive concrétise le droit fondamental pour tout citoyen de l'Union européenne de pouvoir se rendre dans un autre Etat membre en disposant simplement d'une carte d'identité ou d'un passeport en cours de validité. Il n'est ainsi plus question de visa.

Cependant, nous ne pouvons que regretter que ce droit change au bout de trois mois. En effet, le citoyen européen se transforme alors, en fonction de sa situation, en « actif », « inactif » ou « étudiant ». Ce citoyen doit alors disposer de ressources suffisantes et d'une assurance maladie afin de ne pas devenir une charge pour l'assistance sociale de l'Etat-membre d'accueil pendant son séjour. Dans le cas contraire, il peut se voir signifier un refus de séjour sur le territoire par l'administration ou une obligation de quitter le territoire en mentionnant le pays de renvoi. Si après un délai d'un mois, cette personne n'a pas volontairement quitté le territoire, l'obligation peut être exécutée d'office par l'administration. En cas de menace pour l'ordre public ou pour des raisons de sécurité ou de santé publique, le citoyen européen peut faire également l'objet d'un arrêté de reconduite à la frontière ou d'un arrêté d'expulsion.

Nous ne devons pas accepter cette limitation de la liberté de circulation des personnes. Ce type de restriction n'a pour autre but que de limiter tout exode économique de populations issues de pays moins développés que les Etats les plus riches de l'Union européenne. Or, nous ne pouvons pas concevoir la citoyenneté européenne par le prisme des ressources suffisantes ou non d'une personne. Un citoyen européen doit avoir les mêmes droits qu'un citoyen national s'ils vivent dans un même Etat-membre. C'est par le dépassement des frontières nationales par les Européens que ce créera une véritable citoyenneté dans l'Union européenne.

Les dirigeants européens doivent modifier la directive n°2004/38/CE pour ne plus limiter la liberté de circulation des citoyens européens à partir de trois mois. C'est à cette seule condition que pourront être réellement pris en compte les problèmes liés à la liberté de circulation dans le cadre des politiques d'intégration de population européenne, notamment dans leur dimension linguistique.

Fabien Cazenave

Que-la-liberte-de-circulation-ne-soit-plus-limitee-a-trois-mois?lang=fr

Illustration : photographie issue du service audiovisuel de la Commission européenne.

After the Tulip Revolution Comes Roza's revolution?

Federico D'Onofrio, Translated by Francesco Santini — 2010-09-06T03:00:00Z

Kyrgyzstan is neither a big country, nor there are relevant economic Italian interests there (with a few controversial exceptions). For this reason it is not surprising that the Italian media ignored what has been happening recently in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan was the poorest republic of the Soviet Union and in 1991, became a small independent country on the extreme oriental border of the Kyrgyz steppe, with 4 million people. Most of its surface is covered by mountains and there are peaks over 7,000 meters that separate the country from the west Chinese desert (where last year Uyghurs rioted). The capital, Bishkek, was built by Soviets on the plain near the border with Kazakhstan and has nice tree-lined avenues that perpendicularly cross horrible Soviet condominiums and administrative buildings. The other plain is located in the Ferghana valley, on the west borders of the country.

It was in the Ferghana valley, which was under attacks from Islamic fundamentalists during the 90's, that a riot began and eventually extended to the whole country. The riot forced the president Kurmanbek Bakiev to flee and consequently, a new interim government led by opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva was established. The situation is still blurry, Bakiev has not resigned and has launched fervent proclamations from Jalal al Abad, the town where he took refuge. The new interim government has not yet managed to restore the order and in the capital there are still riots that caused the death of dozens of women and men.

The situation is Still Blurry

Usually we look at these episodes in a funny way: as sort of revolutions in banana republics. Bakiev got into power thanks to the Tulip Revolution in 2005. He overthrew the former president Akaev and promised to end the corruption in the country, when in fact he turned out to be worse than his predecessor. During the Bakiev era the opposition was strongly suppressed using arrests and censorship. Similarly to, or even worse than Akaev, he turned out to be more corrupted than his predecessor: the new president gave public enterprises to relatives and friends and stole from public accounts (in this affair Italy was in fact involved: Bakiev's economic advisor was the Russian-American Evgenij Gurevitch, involved in the scandal Ebiscom-Telecom Italian Sparkle).

It could be easy to predict that the new Kyrgyz leadership, as soon as it secured its power, will behave in the same way as Bakiev.

We should avoid however, to consider this revolution as weird, cyclic and actually not relevant for Europeans

Controversial Issues

We should avoid however, to consider this revolution as weird, cyclic and actually not relevant for Europeans. Not only for the reason that, as in 2005, today's riot has been cruel (at least 76 people died) but also because in the country there are important controversial issues that we should not underestimate. There is the tension between the United States and Russia, which both have military bases in the country (the American base is particularly important for the war in Afghanistan). Furthermore, there is the game that India, China and Pakistan play and that we, as Europeans, cannot understand. Finally, there is the problem of Islamic terrorists, who are trained abroad and find easy fuel in the contradictions within the country. On one hand, it is true that Saudi Arabia funds gloomy mosques everywhere in the country, but on the other hand it is also true that the establishment in the capital is not very interested in the provinces (indeed it is not a coincidence that the riot started in Talas).

The Revenues of the State are Secured by the Company Active in the Gold Field

The internal contradictions are not less important. I recall just few of them. The revenues of the state are secured almost exclusively by the company active in the gold filled Kumtor and that itself constitutes a fundamental element of the Kirgiz political life. The relatively rich capital, where you can see big off-road vehicles from members of the government or from foreign officials, has nothing to do with provinces, where people move by horse and live in felt tents. Finally, a potential problem lies in the ethnic composition where there are differences between Russians and Kyrgyzs.

All these Features Together make the Situation not Cyclical, but in Continual Evolution

The problem is the following: how long could we ignore, as Europeans, the evolution of this situation (which is in fact similar to those of other neighbouring countries), before that the whole area develops in a critical direction, maybe like in Afghanistan, or before that China (or India or Pakistan) lay its hands on the country?

Federico D'Onofrio, Translated by Francesco Santini

After-the-Tulip-Revolution-Comes-Roza-s-revolution?lang=en

Image: Flag of Kyrgyzstan, source: WikiMedia Commons

Disclaimer:

This article has been written in spring 2010 when the situation in Kyrgyzstan dramatically changed and published in the Italian version of our JEF e-magazine. Moreover, the article has previously appeared on: Materiali rotabili.

If you would like to contribute with your opinions and ideas on the more recent developments linked to this issue feel free to comment and/or write a new article by contacting us at tnf jef.eu.

The European Union and Multilingualism

Catherine Montfort, Translated by Tomas Spragg — 2010-09-04T03:00:00Z

There are 27 countries and 23 official languages in the European Union. Multilingualism is both a challenge and an asset for our continent. Number 147 of the quarterly federalist publication, “FEDECHOSE”, provides an overview of the changing perceptions of multilingualism in the EU.

Multilingualism has been a fundamental principle of the European Community, which guarantees the equality of each language and a respect for linguistic and cultural diversity. Such respect was “translated” into concrete action from the beginnings of the community, before being formally defined as a policy in itself: thus, no legislation can now come into force at the European level without it being produced in the 23 official languages. This is the subject of the conference that the DGT of the European Commission organised earlier this year in Brussels on the theme of “Translation in the European Commission from 1958 to 2010, a multilingual community work.”

The Commission has presented this opportunity to study the functioning of the multilingual European Economic Community and information from historical archives of the institution and the contribution of some sixty officials have been compiled. This is the first attempt to trace the actual functioning of multilingualism in the Commission since the ECSC. The study shows the role of translation to bring citizens closer to Europe as “the sense of European citizenship is born from the feeling of being understood, accepted and respected in their culture.”

Multilingualism is also a challenge for Europe, its citizens and the European institutions that had to constantly adapt to successive enlargements and the requirements new languages imposed. The use of translators and interpreters will, in the future, be ever more frequent as it is obvious that nobody will be able to master all the languages of the Union. The translation is therefore “the bridge between nations, the key to understanding the other, that element which allows the EU to be ever more human”.

Today, it should be impossible to design a European policy without integrating multilingualism as a prime factor, which is essential for the democratic foundations of the EU, for its innovative capacity and to assess its impact and relevance.

Catherine Montfort, Translated by Tomas Spragg

The-European-Union-and-Multilingualism?lang=en

Article published in Fedechoses No. 147

Image: Tower of Babel, by ThomasThomas on Flickr.

Les priorités de la Présidence belge en matière de sport

Sport et citoyenneté — 2010-09-02T04:00:00Z

Le 1er juillet 2010, la Belgique prendra, à la suite de l'Espagne, la présidence du Conseil de l'Union européenne. Avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, le sport est officiellement devenu une compétence de l'UE. Cela offre à la présidence belge l'honneur d'être la seconde présidence qui contribuera à façonner l'avenir de la politique du sport en Europe.

Les six mois à venir seront une période passionnante puisque la Commission européenne va proposer la Communication pour l'action future de l'UE dans le domaine du sport et que la présidence belge va commencer à préparer la réponse des Etats membres au sein du Conseil.

La présidence belge de l'UE dans le domaine du sport sera conduite par les Communautés, et non par le gouvernement fédéral. En effet, le sport en Belgique est une compétence des entités décentralisées. Conformément à un système de rotation, la Flandre s'est vu attribuer le rôle de leader pour le sport, mais également pour l'éducation, la jeunesse, l'environnement et la pêche. Cela signifie que la Communauté flamande présidera toutes les réunions formelles et informelles sur ces sujets. Le Ministre flamand Philippe Muyters présidera le Conseil des ministres. La Communauté germanophone agira comme porte-parole et à ce titre exprimera le point de vue belge au cours de la présidence. La Communauté française sera l'hôte de la réunion des directeurs des sports. Toutes les préparations se déroulent en étroite collaboration entre les trois communautés pour parvenir à une vraie présidence belge.

Valoriser le rôle sociétal du sport : fair-play, formation, éducation

En ce qui concerne les priorités, la Belgique va travailler dans le cadre qui a été conclu au sein de l'équipe de la présidence avec l'Espagne et la Hongrie. L'étape la plus importante sera, en collaboration avec la Commission européenne, les États membres et le Parlement européen, de commencer à définir les principes stratégiques, les objectifs et les critères du futur cadre de coopération au sein de l'UE ainsi que le prochain Programme Sport sur la base du Livre blanc. La tâche principale consiste à jeter des bases solides pour l'avenir, en coopération étroite avec les représentants du mouvement sportif. L'UE a déjà montré l'utilité de la coopération mutuelle dans le sport au sein d'une structure informelle, par exemple dans le cadre du dialogue social. Le moment est désormais venu de franchir une étape supplémentaire dans cette valeur ajoutée européenne.

La deuxième grande priorité se concentre sur le rôle sociétal du sport, notamment le fair-play, qui tient compte de l'éducation et de la formation, et l'action conjointe entre les Etats membres dans la lutte contre le dopage. Il est important d'agir dans ces domaines où l'UE peut apporter une valeur ajoutée à la politique nationale, par exemple dans la reconnaissance des qualifications sportives et dans la protection de la vie privée des athlètes au sein de l'AMA. En outre, dans le cadre de l'Année européenne de lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale 2010, la Belgique a convenu (avec les deux autres présidences) de promouvoir la reconnaissance du potentiel du sport pour l'inclusion sociale et l'intégration. Ceci est particulièrement important en ce qui concerne l'agenda EU2020.

La présidence belge de l'UE pour le sport est impatiente de collaborer avec tous les États membres ainsi que le mouvement sportif au cours de cette période historiquement importante pour le sport en créant un précédent positif pour les futures politiques.

Sport et citoyenneté

Les-priorites-de-la-Presidence-belge-en-matiere-de-sport?lang=fr

Illustration : Un drapeau belge à Bruxelles

Source : Flickr

SWIFT: Security strikes data protection

Miriam Schriefers, Translated by Lina Ohltmann — 2010-09-02T03:00:00Z

After all, the SWIFT agreement was passed in the European Parliament following strong opposition just six months ago, which had then resulted in a rejection of the agreement by the Parliament. The MEPs celebrated being taken as seriously as the US Congress. Now, 484 MEPs supported the agreement and only 109 MEPs rejected it. Conservatives, Social Democrats and Liberals voted in favour of the agreement.

To remind you of the American view, SWIFT is about the fight against international terrorism with the help of European bank data. “The threat of terrorism the United States and the European Union are facing is ongoing, and with this agreement, all our citizens will be safe”, Obama said in a written statement in which he naturally welcomed the approval by the European Parliament.

The financial services authority SWIFT, which is based in Belgium, is now able again to transmit data on cross-continental bank transfers of EU citizens and companies to the United States starting 1st August 2010 – for a whole five years. With that, the name, address and bank details of a European bank customer can be determined as soon as they transfer money to non-EU countries.

During the first vote on SWIFT in February this year, a number of points were put forward by the MEPs to explain why the agreement had to be seen critically:

* The fact that all data from European bank transfers is automatically given to the United States

* The unlimited storage of data

* The fact that no distinction is made between bank transfers within the EU and to non-EU countries

* The uncertainty regarding the disclosure of information to third countries such as Russia or China

* The important fact that the Europeans do not have comparable access to data of American bank customers

What now?!

* European citizens should in the future be able to obtain information on the use of their data from their national ministry for data protection. They can also request corrections, deletions and blockages. What they cannot do, however, is go to court.

* The amount of data that is to be submitted should be kept at a minimum level

* Only bank transfers to non-EU countries will be checked

* EU officials should monitor the evaluation of data in the United States

The latter is seen as a single concession of the United States towards the Europeans – it is just questionable whether the concessions on the European side have not been much greater. Peter Schaar is one of the critics, being the German government's representative on data protection. According to him, the “Commission's negotiated draft does not fulfil the minimum data security requirements”. His counterpart on the European level, EU data protection representative Peter Johan Hustinx, agrees with him. Particularly criticised is the fact that because of technical difficulties, no individual data of terror suspects can be transmitted directly but instead a datagram is submitted in which much information on numerous respectable citizens can be included.

Since Europe has not been technically and legally able to evaluate the data itself, the European Commission will work on plans for the implementation of a European evaluation over the coming twelve months. “This”, says Hustinx, “data protection officials will have to monitor closely in future.”

Miriam Schriefers, Translated by Lina Ohltmann

SWIFT-Security-strikes-data-protection?lang=en

Image: Vote in the European Parliament. Source: European Parliament on Flickr.

Les conséquences du Traité de Lisbonne pour la République de Moldavie

Alexandru Baltag — 2010-08-31T04:00:00Z

Après la proclamation de l'indépendance de la République de Moldavie, la base juridique de ses relations avec l'Union européenne a été formée par les documents signés entre la Communauté et l'URSS, étant donné que la Moldavie était le successeur par droit de la République soviétique socialiste moldave, partie de l'Union soviétique.

La poussée géographique de l'Union européenne et de l'OTAN du fait de la vague d'élargissement de 2004 et de 2007 est un événement fondamental, qui a déterminé l'élaboration d'une nouvelle politique communautaire pour plusieurs pays, y compris pour la République de Moldavie. Celle-ci est passée à une nouvelle étape dans ses relations avec l'Union européenne. Les relations diplomatiques bilatérales avec les pays européens avancent dans le même temps que le lancement de la politique européenne de voisinage et du Partenariat oriental.

La Communauté a essentiellement changée du point de vue géographique et au niveau de l'approche géopolitique après la dernière vague d'élargissement. Ainsi le Traité de Lisbonne apporte des ajustements et des réglementations appropriés. Une des conséquences les plus importantes de l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne pour la République de Moldavie réside dans la future politique d'élargissement de l'UE. Dans le même temps, le traité accorde à l'Union européenne une personnalité juridique unique, ce qui renforcera le pouvoir de négociation sur le plan mondial et placera l'UE dans la position d'acteur sur le plan international.

Dans le même sens, l'UE aura une position diplomatique unique et participera de manière qualitative au processus de réglementation du conflit de Transnistrie, ce qui est un avantage pour la République de Moldavie. Il est à noter que l'UE a le statut d'observateur dans les négociations au format 5+2. Dans le même contexte, le traité de Lisbonne prévoit le renforcement de l'UE comme « promoteur de la démocratie », élément qui contribuera à l'avancement des réformes démocratiques dans les pays voisins immédiats de l'Europe, notamment dans les Etats ayant des aspirations européennes, y compris la Moldavie.

La recomposition des relations diplomatiques post-Lisbonne

La création de la fonction de Président du Conseil européen, qui aura aussi la fonction de représentant extérieur de l'UE pour les problèmes visant la politique externe et la sécurité commune, constituera un élément important en matière diplomatique dans les rapports bilatéraux moldo-communautaires de la perspective d'un Etat voisin et partenaire de l'UE. Dans le même temps, l'institution de la fonction de Haut représentant pour les affaires extérieures et la politique de sécurité, qui est aussi le vice-président de la Commission européenne, gérera la politique étrangère de l'UE au nom du Conseil européen. Si l'on prend en considération l'importance de certains États au sein de ce Conseil (l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie), on ne peut pas exclure le fait que ceux-ci influenceront beaucoup le cours diplomatique de l'UE.

Ainsi le parcours européen de la République de Moldavie dépendra beaucoup des rapports bilatéraux Berlin-Moscou, Paris-Moscou, Rome-Moscou. Dans le même temps, dans le domaine de la diplomatie européenne, du point de vue systémique et structurel, le traité de Lisbonne prévoit que les délégations de la Commission européenne deviennent de vraies ambassades de l'UE et, petit à petit, les positions de chef de délégation seront groupées avec les positions des représentants spéciaux (en Moldavie, Kalman Mizsei est le Représentant spécial de l'UE pour la République de Moldavie et Dirk Schuebel est le Chef de la délégation de la Commission Européenne dans la République de Moldavie). Dans le même contexte on peut faire référence au vote à la majorité qualifiée par le Conseil de l'Europe (au moins 55% des Etats de l'UE où habitent au moins 65% de la population des Etats membres). Ce fait augmente l'importance et l'influence des Etats de l'Europe occidentale. En conséquence, le moment où s'imposera le problème de l'adhésion de la République de Moldavie, le pouvoir décisionnel appartiendra aux Etats de la « vieille Europe », pouvoir qui sera beaucoup plus grand qu'à présent.

Un autre avantage pour les voisins immédiats de l'UE est la politique européenne de voisinage. Proche de la politique d'élargissement, elle représente un signe pour les pays de l'Europe de l'Est. Ce fait nous prouve qu'au niveau de la perception et de l'approche, Bruxelles considère la politique de voisinage et celle de l'élargissement comme des politiques complémentaires, ce qui pourrait déterminer un changement d'attitude et de stratégie vis-à-vis des États voisins.

Enfin, on parlera du Parlement européen, qui selon le traité de Lisbonne aura de plus grandes compétences en matière de budget, de législation, d'accords internationaux. Les parlements nationaux auront également un rôle accru. Dans ce contexte, nous pouvons faire référence à la diplomatie parlementaire qui joue un rôle très important dans les relations bilatérales et multilatérales de la République de Moldavie avec les États membres de l'UE. Aussi, on sait que les plus importants partis moldaves ont des relations étroites avec les groupes parlementaires européens. Ce fait représente une modalité supplémentaire très importante, grâce à laquelle la voix et la position de la République de Moldavie pourront être mieux entendues dans le cadre du Législatif européen et les intérêts de Chisinau pourront être représentés à un plus haut niveau.

Le traité de Lisbonne ne fera pas tout de suite des « merveilles » pour la République de Moldavie, mais il donne plusieurs signes politiques et diplomatiques très symboliques et offre des opportunités qu'on se doit d'apprécier et de valoriser. Donc, il faut comprendre que l'intégration européenne de la République de Moldavie ne se fera pas à Bruxelles, à Berlin, à Paris ou à Bucarest. L'intégration européenne doit se faire par Chisinau à Chisinau. Dans ce nouveau contexte, la politique intérieure de la République de Moldavie devrait être synchronisée avec la trajectoire de sa politique extérieure.

Alexandru Baltag

Les-consequences-du-Traite-de-Lisbonne-pour-la-Republique-de-Moldavie?lang=fr

Illustration : Carte de la Moldavie

Source : Flickr